A Review of Software-Induced Failure Experience. by Chu, T. L. et al.
A Review of Software-Induced Failure Experience 
T.L. Chu, G. Martinez-Guridi, M. Yue, J. Lehner 
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY 11973 USA 
Submiffed to the American Nuclear Society 51h Internafional Meeting on 
Nuclear Plant Instrumentation Control and Human Machine Interface Technology 
November 2006 
Nuclear Science and Technology Division 
Brookhaven National Laboratory 
P.O. Box 5000 
Upton, NY 11 973-5000 
www.bnl.gov 
Notice: This manuscript has been co-authored by employees of Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC under 
Contract No. DE-AC02-98CH10886 with the U.S. Department of Energy. The publisher by accepting the 
manuscript for publication acknowledges that the United States Government retains a non-exclusive, paid-up, 
irrevocable, world-wide license to publish or reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow others 
to do so, for United States Government purposes. 
Tnts prepr nt 6 ~ntendeo for pub cat on .n a .ournal or proceed ngs S nce changes may be made before 
pub callon n may no! be ate0 or reproa.ce0 w lhoul tne a~ tnor  s perm.sslon 
DISCLAIMER 
This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the 
United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any 
agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, 
subcontractors, or their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or 
assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or any 
third party's use or the results of such use of any information, apparatus, product, 
or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned 
rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service 
by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily 
constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United 
States Government or any agency thereof or its contractors or subcontractors. 
The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or 
reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof 
A Review of SoftwareInduced Failure Experience 
T. L. Chu, G. Martinez-Guridi, M. Yue, and J. Lehner 
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Building 475C, P.O. Box 5000, Upton, New York, 11973, chu@bnl.gov 
Abstract - We present a review of sofiare-induced failures in commercial nuclear powerplants (NPPs) and in several 
non-nuclear industries. We discuss the approach usedfor coNecting operational events related to these failures and the 
imights gainedfrom this review Inparticular, we elaborate on insights that can be used lo model this kind offailure in a 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model. We present the conclusions reached in these areas. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
LA. Background 
As part of the research activities by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's (NRC) staff and its contractors 
on the risk assessment of digital instrumentation and 
controls (I&C) systems (which are part of the Digital 
Instrumentation and Control Research Program) a review 
of software induced failure experience was canied out. 
The objective of this paper is to discuss software 
failures, the approach used for collecting operational 
events related to these failures, and to address several 
issues related to software failures based on the insights 
gained during the review of these events. 
I.B. Motivation for Review of Software Failures 
The NRC staff, its contractors, and a member of the 
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) [I] 
concluded that, as part of the Digital I&C Research 
Program, the following two tasks related to software 
failure experience should be undertaken: 
1. The databases containing software-induced failures 
of technological systems should be reviewed, and 
conclusions should be drawn regarding failure modes 
and their eequency of occurrence. 
In the literature on digital softwafe [2,3,4], 
there are two main interpretations of the concept of 
software failure. The "software-centric" 
interpretation views "failure" as a property of the 
software itself. In other words, the software is 
considered in isolation, and not in the context of the 
system or plant in which it operates. The "system- 
centric" view proposes that the concept of software 
failure is meaningful only when the software is 
considered within a system. This approach is very 
similar to the modeling of human performance; an 
unsafe human act is considered meaningful only in 
the system context within which it occurs, an 
observation that has led the Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Research (RES) to the development of the 
concept of "error-forcing context' (EFC) [ 5 ] .  The 
NRC decided that the databases containing software- 
induced failures should he analyzed to provide 
insights into which of these two interpretations would 
be the appropriate one to understand and treat these 
failures. 
2. Available methods for the identification of failure 
modes and the assessment of the reliability of 
systems that are software driven should be reviewed 
critically. Their domains of validity should be 
determined by examining their assumptions and 
comparing them with the insights gained kom the 
database review. 
This paper addresses the fust task; the second one is 
the subject of follow-up work at Brookhaven 
National Laboratory (BNL). 
I.C. Organization of Paper 
The work carried out to address these comments is in 
Sections I1 through IV. Section I1 presents a conceptual 
model of software failures and their propagation in 
complex engineered systems, as well as a scheme to 
categorize software failures identified in operational 
events ofthese systems. In this report, the terms 
"complex engineered system," "complex system," or 
"technological system" are used to represent a large set of 
systems with a major function, such as a nuclear power 
plant (NPP), or an airplane. 
Sections 111 and IV discuss relevant software failures 
in domestic commercial NPPs and in the non-nuclear 
industries, respectively, including the approach used to 
identify them, and insights gained during their review. 
Section IV also includes a few events that took place at 
foreign NPPs. Finally, Section V presents our 
conclusions. 
ll. APPROACH 
We reviewed the software failure experience in 
different industries and obtained insights on software 
failures. The overall approach of this study is 
summarized in this section. 
By reviewing literature on software reliability, we 
developed a model of software failures. It depicts the 
process through which software faults are introduced 
during the software life cycle stages. Failures occur as a 
result of triggering events and may develop into 
accidents. This model serves as a framework for 
considering software's role in accidents. Section 1I.A 
describes this model in detail. The model is also a 
starting point for developing a software reliability model 
of digital systems. 
The software failure events were collected from a 
variety of sources, as described in Sections 111 and IV. In 
performing our review of software failure events, we also 
carried out a literature review of software failure modes, 
and developed a method for classifying software failure 
events. The objective of the literature review was to 
survey how software Failure Modes and Effects Analyses 
(FMEA) have been performed, and identify the software 
failure modes that others have found to make our list of 
failure modes more complete. The approach is to review 
a) papers that document the experience of performing 
software FMEA, b) operating experience of software 
failures, and c) papers on classifying software failure 
modes and causes. Our classification method is based on 
the failure modes, failure causes, and failure effects of the 
software. The generic failure modes compiled in this 
study are useful in performing a software FMEA, and the 
failure causes are factors to take into consideration when 
developing a software reliability model. Section 1I.B 
provides more detail of the characterization and 
categorization of the software failure events. 
ILA A Sofhvare Failure Model 
Digital systems have some unique features that make 
them different 6om the analog systems and mechanical 
systems that are typically modeled in PRAs. Most of 
these unique features are essential parts of digital systems 
and have a significant effect on the reliability of the 
systems. Therefore, it is important to have methods and 
tools that are capable of modeling these features. 
Software is the most important feature of digital systems. 
Accordingly, it is relevant to discuss the nature of 
software failures to model the impact of software-related 
failures in a PRA. 
To gain a good understanding of the nature of 
software failures, especially for events that have already 
occurred, a conceptual model of the causes of these 
failures, and the propagation of these failures in a 
complex engineered system was developed, and is 
presented in Figure 1. 
Software is developed in several stages that transform 
it from a concept into a code which is executed by a 
computer processor. This development is usually called 
software life cycle (SLC), and it is generally characterized 
in terms of six main stages: system engineering and 
modeling, software requirements analysis, software 
analysis and design, code generation, testing, and 
operation and maintenance. The upper part of Figure 1 
(between the dotted lines) presents a simplified version of 
the SLC. 
At each stage of development, errors may be 
introduced into the software. An example is that the 
requirements analysis may be incomplete, such that a 
requirement of the software is omitted. The earlier in the 
SLC an error is introduced into the software, the more 
severe and costly its impact is likely to be because the 
error is expanded in subsequent stages of development. 
For example, if an error is introduced during the stage of 
"Requirements Analysis," the following stages will 
implement the error, and most likely testing will not 
reveal it; fming it would require revising the entire 
activities of the SLC. 
While the stage of "Testing" attempts to discover 
errors so they are fixed, in practice it is difficult to 
discover all errors. Accordingly, some undiscovered 
errors may, and in many cases do remain in the software 
when it becomes operational. This is particularly true for 
large software that can contain tens or hundreds of 
thousands of source code, and whose logic can be 
complex. 
Testing each possible path of execution would 
require tremendously large resources in terms of time and 
money, so in practice it may he prohibitive. In addition, 
testing detects errors by observing that the results 
obtained from certain inputs are inconsistent with the 
requirements of the software; if the requirements are not 
correct, testing will not be able to discover some of the 
errors. 
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Figure 1 .  Model of Software Failures 
Nevertheless, developing software according to high- 
quality standards in each stage of the SLC is expected to 
produce software that operates correctly, i.e., according to 
its specifications, during most of its operation. 
Accordingly, in general, an undiscovered error is in a 
"dormant" or inactive state since the start of operation of 
the software. A dormant error becomes "active" when it 
is triggered by a specific set of conditions. Thus, a 
software failure occurs when a dormant error becomes 
active. In other words, software failure occurs as a result 
of the combination of a dormant error and the specific set 
of conditions that trigger this error. To simplify the 
discussion in this report, a dormant or inactive error in the 
software is called a software "fault." 
Three important characteristics of a software fault 
are: 
1. It is specific to each design. Since each software is 
developed by different teams which use somewhat 
different approaches to the SLC, it will have its own 
design-specific errors. Hence, the faults may be 
triggered by different sets of conditions. 
2. It is unknown. By the nature of a fault, it is 
undiscovered or hidden in the software until it is 
triggered. 
3 .  The impact of a triggered fault is difficult to predict. 
When the fault is triggered, the software may behave 
in undesirable ways (failure modes), thus causing 
undesirable impacts on the components of the system 
associated with it. Since the fault is unknown, it is 
difficult to predict in advance the impact of its 
associated failure on the software and these 
components. 
Once the software is installed and becomes 
operational, it is embedded in some system, and it 
interacts with some environment, such as the components 
of the system and operator actions. For example, 
assuming that the Main Feedwater system (MFW) is 
using software for its flow control, the software may 
control a device, such as the flow control valves of the 
MFW. Thus, general, software interacts with its 
environment at four levels, depending on the level of 
detail: the software itself, the device(s) controlled by the 
software (e.g., the flow control valves of the MFW), the 
system where the software and the device@) are 
embedded (e.g., the MFW), and the complex engineered 
system, such as the entire NPP. 
At any particular time, the software, the device(s) 
controlled by it, the system where the software is 
embedded, and the NPP, are in a certain state. In general, 
the state of the plant provides an overall context for the 
operation of the software, the devices, and the systems. 
For example, the input to the software will depend on the 
state of the plant. Accordingly, software faults are 
triggered by the input to the software; this input is 
provided by the context (state) of the plant. The context 
of the plant that the software "sees" is particularly 
important because it may trigger a fault, thus causing a 
software failure. The context that causes a software 
failure has been named the "Error Forcing Context 
(EFC)" by Garrett and Apostolakis [4], because, as its 
name implies, it "forces" or activates the error. 
Accordingly, the EFC is the set of conditions that trigger 
a fault. 
Software that was developed and is operated 
according to a high-quality SLC is expected to initially 
operate without failure. Any faults that may remain in the 
software are not active; however, some time after the 
software is installed and placed into operation, an EFC 
may occur, thus causing a software failure by triggering a 
fault. Once the software failure occurs, it may not be 
evident to the plant staff, depending on such factors as to 
whether the failure is automatically annunciated, and 
whether the failure is significant to the operation of the 
plant; a significant failure is expected to cause plant 
changes that are noticeable by the plant staff. The failure 
may remain hidden for some time, until it is discovered. 
The propagation of a software failure to the higher 
three levels (device(s), the system where the software is 
embedded, and the NPP) also depends on the overall 
context of the plant. For example, at the time of the 
software failure, other components, trains, or systems may 
be unavailable due to maintenance or testing, or standby 
components may fail to operate on demand. Hence, the 
software failure may combme with the unavailability of 
other components, trains, or systems, thus propagating 
throughout the plant. 
In general, a software failure is propagated directly to 
the device(s) controlled by the software (e.g., the flow 
control valves of the MFW), which, in turn, may result in 
degradation or failure of the associated system. 
Depending on the overall context of the plant and the 
tolerance to failures of the design of the software, 
device(s), and system, the failure may propagate to the 
overall plant. 
Figure 1 presents the operating environment of the 
software between the dotted lines. There is a rectangle 
(roughly at the center middle) that represents the failure 
of software which results kom the occurrence of the 
overall context (arrow labeled "Error Forcing Context" 
from the rectangle "overall context") triggering a fault(s) 
in the software (arrow 6om the stage "Operation and 
Maintenance" of the SLC). The potential propagation of 
this failure is shown following the arrows downward. 
Thus, the rectangle "Failure of Software" leads to the 
rectangle "Failure of Device," and so on. 
Several systems using software have redundant trains 
(or channels). However, since the redundant trains (or 
channels) of a system may have the same or similar 
software, the failure of the software means that the 
software in all trains fails, thus failing all trains. If this 
common-cause failure (CCF) (included in the rectangle 
"Failure of Software") occurs, it may cause a failure of all 
the devices controlled by the software (included in the 
rectangle "Failure of Device"), and a failure of the entire 
system. 
Given that a software failure occurs, it may he 
possible to halt or mitigate its propagation by taking 
automatic or manual recovery actions. In principle, such 
recovery could be implemented at any of the 4 levels 
previously discussed, i.e., at the software, device, system, 
or complex system (e.g., NPP) level. For example, a 
hypothetical software failure may have propagated to the 
system level, hut recovery actions at this level stopped 
such propagation, so the failure does not have a 
significant negative effect on the overall nuclear plant. 
For simplicity, Figure 1 depicts recovery only for the 
highest level, i.e., the complex-system level. As shown 
by this figure, the combination of a software failure that 
propagated to the complex-system level with the overall 
context may result in a hazardous condition that, if not 
recovered, results in an accident. 
In addition to the failures related to the faults 
introduced in the software during its SLC, software may 
also fail due to external causes or factors, as shown by 
Figure 1. Based on the review of software failures 
described in Sections 111 and IV, four main types were 
identified: 
1. Human error. A person may use the software in an 
inappropriate way, such as using the software in an 
operational environment for which it was not 
designed, or may inadvertently input incorrect data 
into the software. 
2. Supporting systems. In general, the software that is 
used to perform some function in a complex system, 
such as controlling some device(s), requires several 
supporting systems. These systems include other 
software (e.g., an operating system), computer 
hardware (e.g., a hard drive), electric power, and 
possibly a system, such as a Heating, Ventilation and 
Air Conditioning (HVAC) system, that controls some 
variables, e.g., temperature, of the room(s) where the 
computer system is located. 
3. Cyber security. The operation of the software may 
be jeopardized by cybernetic threats, such as viruses 
and hacking activities. The software may he more 
vulnerable if it is embedded in a computer which is 
connected to a network because these threats can he 
transmitted through the network. 
4.  Environment. Events such as fue, flooding, and 
lightning also can jeopardize the operation of the 
computer where the software is embedded. 
Summarizing, the causes of software failure can he 
classified into two major categories: 1) faults (called here 
internal causes because they are associated with the 
software itself) that are triggered by EFCs, and 2) the 
external causes described above. 
n.B Analysis and Characterization of Software 
Failures 
ILB. I Software Failure Mode 
In general, a failure mode of a component is one way 
in which the component fails. A component may have 
several different failure modes. Software failure modes 
are difficult to define because they depend on the level of 
detail at which software failure is being evaluated and the 
specific applications of the software. The failure may be 
defmed in terms of the functions andlor implied functions 
of the software. A narrowly defined function for a 
particular software may lead to the conclusion that the 
software never fails because it always does the narrowly 
defined function. In our view, any deviation J?om the 
expected hehavior, e.g., a violation of one of the 
functions, can be considered a failure. Software failures 
manifest themselves via behavior of hardware. Therefore, 
software failure modes may be defined in terms of 
hardware failure modes. For example, an actuation 
system of a safety system has two types of failure modes, 
failure to actuate on demand and spurious actuation. The 
system level failure modes could be caused by either 
software or hardware. For example, failure of 
communication due to loss of synchronization is a lower 
level software failure mode. In terms of the model of 
software failures shown in Figure 1, the loss of 
synchronization of communication processes associated 
with several devices is a failure mode at a device level 
which may develop into a system failure which impacts 
the complex system. 
The descriptions of the software failure events we 
reviewed often are not detailed enough for us to identify 
the specific software failure modes. Therefore, to identify 
generic failure modes we performed a literature review of 
a) papers on software FMEA performed in aerospace, 
automobile, defense, and nuclear industries, and b) failure 
experience in medical and nuclear industries. 
From the review, we found the following problems 
with the failure mode analysis methods: (1) failure modes, 
failure causes, or failure effects are Gequently mixed up, 
and confusing classifications are often given. Also, 
failure modes, causes, or effects are often defmed 
ambiguously, and sometimes they overlap or even are 
contradictory; (2) the failure mode analysis is either 
performed at the system level (software as an entity) or at 
the element level (it performs one of the software generic 
functions such as input or output) or a level that is not 
clearly defined; (3) although some of the failure mode 
classifications considered failure modes at different levels 
of detail, more specifically at both system level and 
element level, no classifications considered software as 
extremely complex and each of the software elements 
themselves conceptually can be considered as a software 
system (software as an entity) which again consists of 
many elements that can be functionally differentiated. 
The process (and thus the corresponding failure modes of 
the so-called "software system" and "software elements") 
can actually be repeated until we reach the level where 
enough information is available. From this point of view, 
the software can be generally considered to be comprised 
of a nested hierarchical structure of "software system" 
and "software elements," and the failure modes should be 
analyzed for these levels repeatedly to better understand 
the failure modes of the software. 
In an attempt to address these problems, we hereby 
propose a software failure analysis Gamework that 
involves definition of generic failure modes and causes. 
Because of the hierarchical structure of so-called 
"software system" and "software element," it is more 
appropriate to separately define the software failure 
modes (SFMs) at these two levels. One of the difficulties 
in defining a generic software failure mode is that it 
cannot be defined according to its intended functions 
because every software has its particular function. 
Therefore, we introduced the failure modes Gom the 
viewpoint of the dynamic execution process of software 
without being distracted by specific functions of the 
software. More importantly, this dynamic running 
process exactly reflects the behavior of software when it 
is observed, i.e., the observed failures of the dynamic 
process are indeed the failure modes. 
process of software execution. M-I represents 
malfunction of software in its execution which includes 
two sub-modes: 
1. M-I-I Sofmare stalls: In this failure mode the 
software fails and stops generating output, e.g., 
software runs into infinite loop and stops generating 
outputs, and deadlock between processes. 
2. M-1-2 Sofmare runs as usual but with wrong outputs: 
In this failure mode, the software continues running 
but generates incorrect output, e.g., software accepts 
incorrect inputs and generates wrong outputs. 
If the software failure mode is M-I-I, it is relatively 
easy to discover since it ceases all other functions except 
maybe the one it is performing. Identification of M-I-2 is 
more difficult as it appears normal. Usually, it is too late 
to save the overall system from failure for failure mode 
M-I-2. These failure modes can be found in Table I, 
where SFM represents system failure mode, and EFM 
represents element failure mode which will be illustrated 
below. In Table I, each SFM is further expanded into two 
system level failure modes depending on whether or not 
the failure is clearly indicated, e.g., via an error message. 
The system failure modes SFM-1 and SFM-2 are actually 
M-1-1, SFMJ and SFM-4 are M-1-2, and SFM-5 is M-II. 
M-I1 represents problematic, confusing, or poor man- 
machine interface (MMI) designs. It includes misleading 
commands to the user, incomplete or incorrect display of 
information due to software problems, missing alarms, 
and non-conservative output. In this case, the software 
performs its intended functions successfully but 
contributes to human errors or the software fails to 
display the information correctly. This failure mode is 
not found in our literature review. However, this type of 
problem has been found in many software failure events 
and is too important to exclude. Another reason to 
consider this as a failure mode is that an alternate 
interface design is very likely to prevent the same 
accident 6om occurring. 
The above system level failure modes represent a 
natural way of considering software failure modes at the 
highest level. Often, more detailed failure modes are 
necessruy and useful. In order to conduct detailed failure 
analysis, we introduce software element failure modes 
(EFM) based on the observation that usually software can 
be divided into five elements which perform generic 
The following software SFMs are inspired by the 
work in [6] and are defined according to the dynamic 
1.4BI.I' I .  Sofi\vme System and Sofiuarc I:lr.mcnt Failure \lodes 
1 Software System Failure Modes (SFM) ' 
.- -
Software Elements Failure Modes(EFM1 
. - - - - -- -- - -. - - -, 
1 1 I SFM- I : Halt/abnormal termination I Sofrware Elements: 1 1 
M-1-1 EFM-I: INPUT EFM-2: OUTPUT 
EFM-3: COMMUNICATION 
SFM-3: Runs with evidentlv EFM-4: RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
wrong results EFM-5: PROCESSING 
SFM-4: Runs with wrone results - 1 that are not evident Generic Failure Modes ofSoftware Elements: 
I 1. Timinglorder failure, 
2. Interrupt induced failure, 
3. Omission of a required function or attribute, 
SFM J: problematic, 4. Unintended function or attribute in addition to intended functions and 
or less informative interface attributes, 
5. Incorrect implementation of a function or attribute, I I 
6. Data error which cannot be identified and hence is not rejected by 
software logic. 
functions of the software. Generally, software takes input overall system; and C-1-2 Using problematic or outdated 
data kom hardware. A pre-processing may be performed standardslpolicies. 
during the data input process. The input data will then be 
processed, and the output data is sent out. During the C-II. Software requirement analysis: The failure 
execution of the software, resources are required, such as causes include incomplete or incorrect requirements of 
memory and CPU, and communication may occur software. An example is that certain functions which the 
between different software processes. Hence, a software software should perform were not specified (and thus not 
may be functionally subdivided into the following coded in the software). Typical example causes include: 
elements: NPUT, OUTPUT, COMMUNICATION, C-11-1 Conditions that might impact on a specific function 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION; and PROCESSING. Table are not taken into account, e.g., exception condition is not 
I lists generic failure modes for the five software specified; C-11-2 Missing functions: desired functions are 
elements. These failure modes are applicable to all the not specified in the requirements; and C-11.3 Incorrect 
software elements. In addition, each element has some specifications: desired specification exists, but is 
unique failure modes; these specific failure modes can be incorrect. 
classified as one of the six generic failure modes listed in 
Table I. C-111. Software analysis and design: Failures include 
failure to include desired functions of software, and 
ILB.2 Software Failure Cause adoption of improper algorithms, methods, or structures 
of individual parts of the software. Timing interaction 
We reviewed the papers on software FMEA and the between data and processes is more critical for real-time 
software failures events, and developed the categories of digital systems. For non-real time systems, 
software failure causes listed below. The first six communication failure between multiple processes might 
categories (C-I to C-VI) are internal causes related to the also be caused by this issue. Some of the general causes 
stages of the SLC described in Section 1I.A. The last at this stage are: C-111-1 Calculation, C-111.2 Algorithm, 
category (C-VII) gives external causes. Problems with C-111-3 Logic, C-111.4 Data handling (manipulation other 
documentation may become a failure cause at each stage than computation), C-111-5 Fault tolerance, C-Ill-6 
of SLC. A list of documentation problems is shown in Interface, and C-111-7 Temporal fault. 
Table A.21 in [7] and they are not explicitly listed here. 
C-IV. Code generation: The failure causes may 
C-I. System engineering and modeling: An example introduce the errors, commonly known as bugs, in the 
of failure is that a developed software cannot be software because the software was not coded as intended. 
integrated into the overall system. Some typical example Thus, it does not function as expected in certain situations 
causes are: C-1-1 incompatibility between software and even if there is no problem with previous stages of 
development, such as "requirement analysis." Examples 
of typical causes of failure include: C-IV-I Typo: mis- 
spelled variables, incorrect variables usage, e.g., 
referencing wrong data variable; and C-IV-2 Functions 
not coded although designed. 
C-V. Testing: Testing itself should not introduce 
failures, hut grossly insufficient or inappropriate testing 
before the release of the software will leave other causes 
undiscovered. Some of the causes are: C-V-I Incomplete 
test plan andlor test procedures; C-V-2 Test plan was not 
implemented or executed appropriately; C-V-3 Regression 
test was not performed on modified software; C-V-4 
Untested for different running environments that might be 
encountered; C-V-5 No validation before initial release; 
C-V-6 No validation on software changes; and C-V-7 
Quality assurance plan problem. 
C-VI. Operation and maintenance: The failures can 
be caused by modifications of the software. Some ofthe 
typical causes include: C-VI-I Improper upgrades of 
software because of wrong procedures; C-VI-2 Failure to 
upgrade related systems including both software or 
hardware, such as incompatibility between upgraded 
software and the existing hardware; C-VI-3 Software 
configuration plan, maintenance plan, and product support 
plan problems after the installation or upgrades; C-VI-4 
Software configuration management prohlem; C-VI-5 
System administration, e.g., incompatible operating 
system caused software failure. 
C-VII. As discussed in subsection II.A, the external 
causes are Human error, Supporting Systems, Cyber 
Security, and Environment. Failure cause C-VII should 
not be considered a pure software failure. The failure of 
the software was caused by hardware or human behaviors 
beyond the software capability. However, it is listed as a 
software failure cause because this represents dependence 
of software on its operating environment. 
The internal causes introduce software faults in one 
or more of the SLC stages. These faults do not 
necessarily cause immediate failure. Software fails due to 
either faults being triggered by an error forcing context or 
external causes. 
IILA. Approach 
Relevant operational events associated with software 
failures in domestic NPPs were identified to gain insights 
into the nature of these failures in terms of such 
characteristics as the specific cause of failure of the 
software, the associated error-forcing context, and any 
dependent failures, such as common cause failures. 
The main approach for identifying software failures 
in domestic NPPs was to use the NRC's "Licensee Event 
Report (LER) Search System." The search for LERs was 
conducted according to the following guidelines: 
A) At the time of this study, the LER Search System 
contained the LERs from January 1, 1984 through 
December 3 I ,  2005. This range of 22 years was 
searched for software failures. 
B) All plants that operated during this period 
C) All modes of operation of the plants, such as power 
operation and shutdown. 
D) Since the LER Search System does not directly 
distinguish failures related to software, a search was 
conducted to identify those LERs containing the 
keyword "software" in the LER's abstract and title. 
This was considered to be an efficient way of 
identifying LERs that are potentially associated with 
software failures. This search yielded 175 LERs. 
Each of the 175 LERs potentially associated with 
software failures was individually reviewed to assess 
whether a software failure actually occurred. Using this 
approach, 106 events related to software failures were 
included in a database. Seven additional LERs that 
documented a software failure were added to the 
database; they had not been identified in the automatic 
search because they did not include the keyword 
"software" in either the abstract or the title. 
Hence, the current total number of LERs associated 
with software failure(s) included in the database is 113. 
The database containing these LERs can he sorted by a 
variety of criteria, such as by date of the event or by LER 
number, and can be queried using one or more keywords 
in one or more fields. To the extent supported by the 
information in an LER, each event is characterized in the 
database in terms of the following properties: LER 
Number, Event Date, Plant (the specific nuclear unit(s) 
involved), Title (of the LER), Summary (description of 
the software failure), Causes, Consequences (the impact 
of the software failure on the safety of the plant), Error 
Forcing Context, Dependent failure (dependent failure(s) 
associated with software), and References (the source of 
information of the event). 
m.B. Insights 
The work to characterize software failures in 
domestic NPPs focused on developing an approach to 
identify events potentially related with this type of 
failures, screening these events, and designing and 
developing the datahase. The following main insights 
were gained during this process: 
A) 71 different nuclear units have at least one event 
related to software failure during the period studied. 
This means that software failures have occurred in a 
significant number of units, so it is a type of failure 
that has extended to many units. Hence, this type of 
failure may occur in any ofthe operating units that 
use software-supported systems. 
B) In 17 of the 11 3 LERs documenting software failures, 
two nuclear units are identified. This means that 
there have been 130 events associated with software 
failures in different nuclear units during the period 
studied. 
C) The 45 LERs that occurred during the last 10 years of 
the period stored in the database, i.e., January 1, 1996 
to December 3 1,2005, were analyzed to classify the 
"software failure mode" and the cause of the failure 
according to the categorization scheme presented in 
Section 1I.B. The following conclusions were 
reached: 
C. 1) Regarding the "software failure mode," 3 1 out 
of the 45 events (i.e., about 69%) had the failure 
mode "Runs with wrong results that are not 
evident." The next failure mode with most hits 
is "Runs with evidently wrong results" with 7 
out of the 45 events (i.e., about 16%). The fact 
that most of the events studied have the failure 
mode "Runs with wrong results that are not 
evident" may be a reason for concern because it 
is undesirable to have software that is executing, 
sometimes for long periods of time, and 
producing incorrect results. 
C.2) Software failures were due to a variety of 
causes. The most predominant cause is "Software 
requirements analysis" with 16 out of the 45 events 
(i.e., about 36%). In general, when software fails due 
to this cause, it fails to perform a function because 
when its requirements were specified, they did not 
include this function. The second cause is 
"Operation and maintenance" with 12 out of the 45 
events (i.e., about 27%). Most of the events related 
to "Operation and maintenance" involve a failure 
introduced during modifications or upgrades of the 
software after the software was developed, installed 
and had operated for some time. In other words, 
software that was meeting its expected fimctions was 
modified, and some fault was introduced during this 
modification. 
D) Most of the software failures appear to have 
happened in non-safety-related systems. It is not 
known what is the main cause(s) for this situation. 
Potential reasons are 1) safety-related systems that 
use software have higher quality standards, and hence 
have a lower probability of failure, 2) possibly, 
software has been more commonly used in non- 
safety-related systems than in safety-related ones, and 
3) a combination of potential reasons 1 and 2. 
E) In many cases, the specific combination of conditions 
that comprise the EFC, i.e., the conditions that 
triggered an (inactive) software fault into an (active) 
software failure, was identified for a particular LER. 
The review of software failures also revealed that in 
some cases a failure may occur as soon as the 
software became operational, but it may remain 
hidden for a long time, i.e., several years. In these 
cases, the EFC is the normal operation of the plant. 
The failure may he discovered by indirect means, 
such as discrepancies in the results produced by 
alternative calculations (see Section 1I.A for a 
discussion of the EFC). A failure that is hidden for a 
long time, or that is discovered by indirect means, 
appears to be usually associated with a non-safety- 
related system which 6equently has regulatory 
requirements that are less stringent than those applied 
to safety-related ones. 
F) Most of the software failures identified in this review 
had low safety significance for the plant involved. 
For example, a software failure might have resulted 
in a violation of the regulatory requirements, such as 
Technical Specifications, of the plant. This violation 
may have resulted in the loss of functionality of some 
system(s) and an automatic or manual reactor trip. 
However, during the event the plant may have other 
available redundant systems that perform the same 
function of the lost system(s); accordmgly, the safety 
significance of the software failure may he 
considered minor. The assessment of the 
consequence of a software failure on the associated 
NPP used the evaluation of the safety impact 
contained in the LER. 
G) In 29 of the events, i.e., about 26% of the 11 3 LERs, 
some type of dependent failure, including common 
cause failures (CCF), occurred. An additional 13 
LERs, i.e., about 12% ofthe 113 LERs, potentially 
involved dependent failures; enough information was 
not found in the associated LERs to assess in a 
conclusive way whether such failures had actually 
occurred. Hence, the potential of software failures to 
cause dependent failures, including CCF, is 
demonstrated. Since a dependent failure can be 
significant to the risk of a NPP, a software failure has 
the potential to be a significant contributor to the risk 
of a NPP. 
N .  FAILURES IN THE NON-NUCLEAR 
INDUSTRIES 
N.A.  Approach 
The general approach we adopted to collect software 
failure events in non-nuclear industries was to search 
through the internet and web-based databases. We started 
6om some websites that contain brief descriptions of 
many possibly software related incidents or accidents. In 
general, only those events that are typically software 
failure related were further investigated. Each of these 
websites may have a number of events that are claimed to 
be computer related but only some of these events can be 
verified to be caused by computer or software failures 
using the official reports 6om different websites such as 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and 
Department of Energy (DOE). For government websites 
that contain databases, additional queries were performed 
to collect more related events. 
Some examples of the non-government websites 
include "Com~uter Horror Stories" at 
http: \r.~rw.cs.t~u.ac.il oo7Enaihu.md horror html. 
"Collection of Sofi\rarc r4urs" 31 
- 
httD:i/www5.in.tum.de/-hucklehse.html, and Risks 
Digest at h~://catless.ncl.ac.ukiRisks/. 
The first two websites list a number of events with very 
brief descriptions. The Risks Digest illustrates risks to the 
public due to the use of computer systems and related 
technology, and summarizes as one-liners most of the 
interesting cases over the past decades. The incidents are 
not limited to any certain area. In fact, either brief or 
detailed illustration of almost every important computer 
related event can be found here. 
The sources below contain official reports and were 
used in this study: 
(1) NTSB Aviation Accident Database. This database 
contains data describing the aircraft, operations, 
personnel, environmental conditions, consequences, 
probable causes, and contributing factors of civil aviation 
accidents within the United States, its territories and 
possessions, and in international waters. This database is 
shared by the NTSB and FAA. The Safety Board also 
investigates some incidents, including them in the 
database in the same form as accidents. Typically, 
incidents do not involve the level of injury or damage in 
the same form as an accident. The NTSB database 
website also provides information query service. Some of 
the data collected here was obtained using the query with 
"software" and "computer" as keywords. 
(2) Aviation Safety Network (ASN) Database. This 
database provides limited query capability, and contains 
descriptions of safety occurrences of over 10,000 airliner, 
military transport aircraft and corporate jet aircraft since 
1943. For each event, it gives a brief description; most 
descriptions are 6om official reports. 
(3) NASA Description of Missions. It gives a list of 
known lunar and planetary missions. Limited query 
capability is available. Both successful and failed events 
are collected in this chronology. Detailed reports are 
provided. 
(4) Computer-Related Incidents with Commercial 
Aircraft. The website gives only incidents and accidents 
of commercial airplanes. For each event, it provides both 
a brief description and a detailed report. Most of the 
reports are official. 
(5) Some other websites do not have systematically 
maintained databases but reports that contain 
investigation of the accidents can be obtained 6om these 
websites. For example, the 2004 blackout report is 
available 6om the DOE website. Other sources of the 
collected data include various publications and books. 
1V.B. Insights 
We reviewed software failure events in more than 10 
different industries, mainly by searching the internet to 
identify events, reviewing the event descriptions, and 
screening out those that are not software failure related or 
not considered interesting. We also included 4 failure 
events that took place at foreign NPPs by reviewing a 
report of the Nuclear Energy Agency [S], and one event 
that is not reported in the LER database that occurred at 
the Davis Besse plant due to a virus [9]. The total number 
of software failure related events in non-nuclear industries 
is 43. Including the 5 nuclear events, a total of 48 events 
were obtained. The actual number of events that we 
identified as software related is much higher than this. 
However, most of them were screened out after reviewing 
the detailed description or official investigation reports of 
these events. The consequences of most of the 48 
software related events are very severe, because people 
only tend to identify root causes of very severe events and 
only those sources that contain the most important or 
well-known events are available to the public. The nature 
of our search does not allow the events to be used in a 
statistical analysis because the screening of events is 
subjective, and no attempt was made to identify the time 
period in which the search was performed. 
The review of events found that software failures 
occurred in every industry that uses digital systems. 
Practically all system and element level failures modes 
and failure cause categories we defmed (in subsection 
1I.B) have taken place. At the software element level, the 
processing element has the most failure events. The more 
frequent element failure modes are incorrect 
implementation and omission of functions or amibutes. 
Errors at the software requirement analysis stage are the 
most important failure cause. 
In general, the different types of software failures are 
applicable to domestic NPPs. They represent different 
types of events that are important to consider in analyzing 
and modeling software. For example, in a software 
hazard analysis or a software FMEA, it is desirable to be 
able to capture all these types of failures. The following 
examples illustrate some of the intricacies in termsof the 
needed level of detail and scope of the analysis. From a 
quantitative reliability point of view, the failures do not 
necessarily have to be modeled as explicitly, as long as 
the impacts ofthe failures are captured in some way. 
1) A stuck-at-one fault on a data line of the Traffic 
Collision Avoidance System of the Korean Air Cargo 
flight contributed to a near miss collision with a British 
Air flight. A model at the individual bit level would be 
required to capture this type of failure. 
2) A few events occurred due to faults in diagnostic 
software, interrupts, and communications. They involve 
software that is part of the platform hardware, of the 
operating system, or of the communication software. For 
example, at Darlington, the hardware diagnostic software 
contributed to the stalling of the computers and eventually 
shutdown of the reactor. To capture these failures, the 
non-application software would have to be modeled. 
3) A few events involved failure of identical software in 
redundant systems due to common cause software 
failures. For example, a software exception caused failure 
of both inertial reference systems of the Ariane 5 launch 
vehicle which exploded on takeoff [lo]. Software CCF 
is real and has to be modeled in a quantitative reliability 
model. 
4) Poor man-machine interface contributed to a few 
accidents. For example, in the 2003 blackout, the 
computer alann system at First Energy was not available 
for a long time without any indication due to a race 
condition [ I  I], and prevented early mitigation of the 
blackout. A good model of operator and software 
behavior would be necessary to provide a method for 
identifying the accident scenario. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We reviewed software failure events in different 
industries and some papers on software FMEA. We also 
defmed generic software failure modes and causes. The 
lessons learned and insights are summarized in this 
section. 
V.A Review of Software Failure Events 
We searched the LER database to identify software- 
related failure events at domestic NPPs, and searched the 
internet for events that took place in other industries and 
other countries. The search of the LER database is a more 
systematic search, i.e., based on search for the keyword 
"software" in the abstract and title of the LERs. Using 
this approach, a database containing the information kom 
113 LERs documenting software failures was developed. 
They were identified for all modes of operation of all 
plants that operated during the period Januaq 1, 1984 
through December 3 I, 2005. This database can be 
considered a repository of raw information on software 
failures that occurred at domestic NPPs. 
The internet search was somewhat ad hoc. We 
subjectively decided if an event should be included based 
on whether or not it is important, interesting, or of serious 
consequence. A large number of events were screened 
out this way. Another criterion used is covering a large 
number of industries. The information collected based on 
the internet search is essentially limited to publicly 
available information. 
By reviewing the events and the literature on 
software failure modes and effects analysis, we developed 
a model of software failure which depicts how: 
(1) software faults are introduced in the software's life 
cycle stages, (2) EFCs trigger software failures, and 
(3) software failures contribute to accidents that are 
considered in a PRA. The model of software failure is 
shown in Figure 1, and provides a high-level picture of 
how software failures fit into accidents, and a foundation 
for including software failures in a probabilistic model 
such as a PRA. 
In reviewing the software failure events, we 
recognized that it is difficult to defme software failure 
modes because they occur in many different ways which 
depends on specific applications. In our review of papers 
on software FMEA, we found that different ways of 
defming failure modes, causes, and effects were proposed 
and they suffer from a few shortcomings. For example, 
failure modes, failure causes, or failure effects are 
frequently mixed up, defined ambiguously, and 
sometimes they overlap or even are contradictory. In an 
attempt to address these problems with the current 
software failure categorization methods, we developed a 
software failure categorization kamework that involves 
defmition of generic failure modes and failure causes. 
We consider a software as a nested hierarchical structure 
of "software system" and "software elements", and 
defined generic failure modes at hoth levels based on the 
dynamic execution process of a software without being 
distracted by specific functions of the software. Table 1 
summarizes the failure modes, and more detailed 
defmitions are given in Section I1.B. The generic failure 
modes can be used to support software FMEA by 
providing a generic list of potential failure modes. 
We defme two types of software failure causes, 
internal and external causes. Internal causes represent 
errors made in different stages of the software life cycle, 
and are further broken down into causes at the different 
stages. External causes include human errors, failures of 
systems supporting the software, cyher security problems 
such as viruses and hackers, and environmental problems 
such as electromagnetic interferences. Strictly speakmg, 
a software failing to perform due to the external causes is 
not a software failure because the software cannot run 
without proper support, such as hardware. However, 
external factors cause a large number of software failure 
events and cannot be ignored. Therefore, the external 
causes are also included here. Classifying software 
failure causes can potentially be used to support 
developing a quantitative software reliability analysis 
method by considering the quality of the stages of the 
software life cycle. 
We selected several software failure events that 
occurred in domestic nuclear plants and in other industries 
for detailed analysis, including categorizing them 
according to the above failure modes and causes. In 
addition, the EFCs of the events were described in as 
much detail as possible, and how the likelihood of the 
EFC can be estimated was discussed. In a few cases, the 
kequency or conditional probability of the EFC was 
estimated using available informationldata. However, it 
is not too useful trying to use these software failure events 
as data to estimate a software failure rate, because the rate 
would be that of a historical event which will probably 
never take place again. This is one reason quantitative 
software reliability analysis is difficult. Such historical 
events can potentially be used in validation of quantitative 
software reliability methods, by providing case studies 
and possibly failure data as well. For example, if a 
software reliability method is developed to use 
information on how good a job was done in the stages of a 
software life cycle to estimate sofcware failure 
ratelprobability, it can he applied to a historical event to 
perform a benchmark study. 
The insights learned 6om reviewing the software 
failure events of domestic NPPs are: 1) a majority of the 
nuclear units in the United States (US) has experienced 
software failures, though most of the failures identified in 
this review (in the US nuclear indushy) had low safety 
significance for the plant involved, 2) software failures 
were due to a variety of causes, and incorrect 
specification of requirements is an important cause, 3) 
most of the failures happened in non-safety-related 
systems, probably because non-safety-related systems are 
more commonly used and software of safety systems have 
higher quality standards, 4) a software failure may occur 
as soon as it becomes operational, but may remain hidden 
for a long time before it is discovered, 5) most of the 
software failures identified in the review have low safety 
significance, and 6 )  approximately one quarter of the 
events involved dependent failures. 
The insights learned kom reviewing the software 
failure events of other industries and other countries are: 
1) the events are more severe than those of domestic 
NPPs, and their failure modes and causes are in general 
applicable to domestic NPPs, 2) different types of 
software failures were identified and they demonstrate the 
needed level of detail and scope of the analysis in order to 
capture them, e.g., modeling of non-application software 
(hardware diagnostics, intempts, communication) and 
man-machine interface, 3) most of the software failures 
involved control systems and not protection systems, 
probably because control systems are more numerous, 
4) practically all system and element failure modes we 
defmed have happened, and 5) defective requirement 
specifications is an important cause of software failure. 
For software failures to occur due to internal causes, 
two conditions have to be satisfied: the software must 
have faults in them, and triggering events have to occur to 
induce the failures. Software faults or hugs, are 
introduced in the life cycle stages of the software and 
become a property of the software. An error-forcing 
context (EFC) is the set of events outside the software that 
trigger the inputs causing a software failure. Hence, the 
occurrence of software failure is due to the occurrence of 
EFC which is random and can he modeled 
probabilistically in terms of a failure rate. For a given 
software, the frequency that failure occurs is the same as 
the 6equency of the triggering events. Therefore, the 
6equency of software failure depends hoth on the quality 
of the software life cycle stages and the operating 
environment. The failure rate of software failures in 
principle varies as a function of time, but a reasonable 
approximation for the purpose of assessing software 
reliability is a constant failure rate. 
Our review and analysis of events associated with 
software failures indicated that the concept of an EFC, 
i.e., a set of specific conditions, triggering a software fault 
into a failure is actually the way in which software 
failures occur. Hence, it is relevant to identify the EFCs 
associated with a particular software, and this implies 
taking into account the system (in a very broad sense, 
such as an entire NPP) in which the software operates. In 
past meetings on digital I&C research, an ACRS member 
[I] has pointed out that there are two interpretations of the 
concept of software safety, i.e., "system-centric" and 
"software-centric" viewpoints, and indicated that the issue 
is important to the proper treatment of software "failures." 
The "system-centric" viewpoint would include the 
interactions of the software with the surrounding system 
and thus, at least conceptually, it would be possible to 
identify the EFCs. In addition, the "system-centric" 
viewpoint should be used in developing a model of digital 
systems that will be integrated into a PRA. However, it 
appears that the "software-centric" viewpoint, as defmed 
by the ACRS member, would only analyze the software in 
"isolation," i.e., without considering the system in which 
the software operates. In this sense, we agree with the 
ACRS member that such extremely narrow analysis of 
software would fail to discover many relevant EFCs. 
In addition, we note that such a narrow "software- 
centric" viewpoint should not be applied when software is 
developed. According to the six stages of the software 
life cycle described in Section 11.A and depicted in 
Figure 1, the interactions of the software with the 
surrounding system are carefully analyzed and evaluated, 
so that the software is designed to properly interact with 
the surrounding system. In particular, the first stage of 
the software life cycle, "System engineering and 
modeling," does include the consideration of the system 
in which the software will be embedded. The interaction 
of the software with its surroundmg system also is taken 
into consideration during the "Testing" stage of the 
software life cycle. A software has one or more operating 
modes, and the failure rate estimate of a black box model, 
e.g., [12, 131, represents the failure rate of a specific 
operating mode or the averaged failure rate of all 
operating modes. This type of modeling uses actual 
operating data or test data of the specific software 
collected 6om an environment representing the actual 
operating environment. In that sense, the modeling 
accounts for the operating environment or context. In the 
case of test data, the design and selection of test cases also 
have to take into consideration the operating profiles. 
Thus, the design of software certainly should have taken 
into consideration the operational environment and 
operational modes. 
Hence, in our opinion, there is no contradiction 
between "software-centric" and "system-centric" 
viewpoints of software failures. They have different 
emphases and their applications have different objectives. 
The "system-centric" viewpoint considers and models the 
complex engineered system around the software, while 
the "software-centric" viewpoint only considers the 
operating environments as boundary conditions of the 
software; that is, the "software-centric" viewpoint does 
not simply consider software failure as a property of the 
software itself, but also considers software failure as a 
function of the operating environmenticontext. 
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